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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the 
process of petroleum mining, and in particular, the aspect 
of licensing and the dual role the Crown has in its capacity 
as both licensee and licensor. From a broader perspective, 
many of the issues raised here can also be related to issues 
raised in the development off other natural resources. 
Naturally, because of the strategic and economic importance 
1 
of this resource, the legal, philosophical, and commercial 
aspects of petroleum mining makes institutional framework 
for dealing with this natural resource slightly different. 
The paper will outline the general substantive provisions of 
the Petroleum Act 1937 pertaining to the licensing regime, 
and in particular, look at those provisions in light of a 
case study of recent ministerial action in issuing a mining 
licence. 
1 In terms of market share of energy resources for the 
year 1985 in industry and commerce, oil provides for 20.5 
percent of New Zealand's needs, and similarly, for 
transport, 94.6 percent; with the total annual oil fuel 
expenditure for New Zealand in the year 1983 being $1.7 
billion: New Zealand Official Yearbook (92e), Department of 
Statistics, Wellington, New Zealand, 1987. 
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With specific reference to the case study, the paper will 
then discuss some commercial issues raised in petroleum 
mining licensing particularly those consequent to the fact 
that the Crown may issue licences to itself, the effect the 
Commerce Act 1986 may have on that, and also the effect the 
laws of contractual and equity may have on the Crown in the 
particular circumstances. Focus will then be made on 
ascertaining the scope of Crown discretion under this 
particular regime, and again, the case study will provide a 
basis for discussion. 
Finally, the above matters will provide the background for 
some possible reform, and to this end, there will be an 
examination of the Ministry of Energy Corporate Report 
(1987), and a brief look at the issues raised in the current 
process of resource management law reform. 
II. THE CASE STUDY 
On 21 July 1977, the Crown was granted a petroleum 
prospecting licence (PPL 38034) over an area in Taranaki. 
Various changes to the interests in PPL 38034 occurred over 
a period of time until 1986, when the then current holders 
were finally settled upon. The prospecting activities in 
licence area 38034 were carried out initially by Petrocorp 
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Exploration Limited, 2 and later, jointly with the Crown. 
From 1986 until the expiry of the extended licence on 21 
July 1987, the prospecting activities were carried out by 
the joint venture comprising the Crown, Petrocorp 
Exploration Limited, Petrocorp Exploration (Taranaki) 
Limited, Payzone Exploration Limited, Southern Petroleum No 
Liability, Nomeco New Zealand Limited, Bligh Oil & Minerals 
(NZ) Limited, and Carpentaria Exploration Company (NZ) 
Limited. A result of these activities was the discovery of 
hydrocarbon deposits in the Waihapa, Tariki, and Ahuroa 
areas. 
In September 1987, the Crown invited submissions of 
notification of interest in acquiring the Minister of 
Energy's joint venture shares in four petroleum mining 
licences (PML): 
(1) 51.00 percent interest in PML 38137 at Stratford, 
(2) 38.36 percent interest in PML 38138 at Tariki, 
2 A wholly owned subsidiary of Petroleum Corporation of 
New Zealand Limited, the state owned corporation formed in 
1978 to take responsibility for the government's interests 
in petroleum and gas. The subsidiary itself was formed for 
the purpose of holding the government's interest in offshore 
petroleum exploration and also to conduct its own onshore 
exploration programme. In 1987, Petroleum Corporation of 
New Zealand Limited "privatised" by issuing 15.38 percent of 
its issued share capital to the public. A further 15.38 
percent was held by BIL Equities (No 2) Limited, and 69.23 
was held by or on behalf of the Crown. 
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(3) 38.36 percent interest in PML 38139 at Ahuroa, and 
(4) 38.36 percent interest in PML 38140 at Waihapa. 
Bids for the Crown interests closed in January 1988. In 
February 1988, an oil discovery in Waihapa (PML 38140) was 
announced by Petrocorp. Based upon the technical data 
relating to the discovery, Petrocorp applied to enlarge the 
area to which PML 38140 applied. On 4 May 1988, the 
Minister of Energy announced a "new oil discovery" in a 
field called 11 Ngaere 11 • 3 Significantly, Ngaere is adjacent 
to the PML areas offered for sale. The announcement 
contained notice that the Minister was granting to himself 
(acting on behalf of the Crown), a mining licence for the 
area of the discovery, and that bids made under the previous 
"sale" of Crown interests in the adjacent PML's were 
"declined". Finally, the announcement also expressed the 
Minister's intention to offer the Crown's interest in both 
the Ngaere and the adjacent PML's to the other joint 
venturers in the adjacent PML's. 
III. THE PETROLEUM ACT 1937 
3 See National Business Review, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 5 May 1988, p. 1; Evening Post, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 5 May 1988, at p.10; and Press Statement from the 
Minister of Energy, 4 May, 1988. 
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For the purposes of the discussion in this paper about 
petroleum mining licensing regime, the following is a 
summary of the salient features of the Petroleum Act 1937. 
The objective of the Act is derived from the long title - to 
encourage and regulate the mining of petroleum. Because of 
4 its variant forms, and therefore its various physical 
attributes, aspects of ownership were not dealt with 
comfortably under common law. 5 From the legislative 
viewpoint, petroleum existing in its "natural condition" 
below the surface of land is declared the property of the 
6 Crown. The Act then provides for an administrative 
framework under the aegis of the Minister of Energy ("the 
' . t 11 ) f t' 7 t t' 8 ' 9 d Minis er or prospec ing, ex rac ion, processing, an 
distribution10 of the mineral. There is a general 
4 See the definition of petroleum in the Petroleum Act 
1937, s. 2. 
5 See Petroleum development and New Zealand law, Essays 
prepared for the Faculty of Law, Victoria University of 
Wellington, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1984, 
at p. 15. 
6 Petroleum Act 1937, 3. s. 
7 Ibid 5. s. 
8 Ibid 12. s. 
9 Ibid 19. s. 
10 Ibid 50. s. 
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prohibition against prospecting or mining without a 
1 . 11 icence. 
The Minister may grant prospecting licences upon terms and 
conditions as the Minister may in his discretion specify. 12 
Section 6 of the Act provides for the term of the licence 
which is for a period not exceeding 5 years and deals with 
extension - one extension is available upon application by 
the licensee during the term of the licence, such extension 
to exceed neither the term of nor more than half the area of 
the original licence. The Minister must issue an extension 
if the licensee has substantially complied with the terms 
and conditions of the licence and the Minister is satisfied 
that both the work programme proposed will provide for the 
satisfactory exploration of the extended licence area, and 
that the land to which the extension is subject is not such 
that prospecting by a subsequent licensee in the residual 
area of the licence will not be hindered. 13 The original 
licensee may apply for a new licence in the area in the 
original licence which became residual as a result of the 
extension process. 
ll Ibid s. 4. 
12 Ibid s. 5. 
lJ Ibid s.6 (4). 
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Possession of a petroleum prospecting licence confers on the 
licensee the exclusive right to prospect and to that end, 
mine in the licence area, provided the operation does not 
interfere with the occupation and use of that land by 
14 another. The licensee is required to abide by all other 
Acts and regulations which affect or apply to the 
activity, 15 and there is no proprietary right in any 
petroleum derived from the land except as a result of the 
1 . , t. 16 icensee s opera ion. There is also the requirement for 
the licensee to pay a deposit or bond prior to the 
' ' t ' f th 1 . l 7 d 1 t f d . acquisi ion o e icence, an a so paymen o, uring 
the currency of the licence, an annual fee. 18 
The Minister has broad discretion to modify or suspend the 
prospecting licence upon the application of the licensee. 19 
Prior to the expiry of a prospecting licence, if the 
licensee satisfies the Minister that there has been a 
discovery and that if a mining licence is granted, the 
licensee would be able to satisfy the conditions of the 
14 Ibid 7 (1) and ( 2) • s. 
15 Ibid, 7 ( 3) • s. 
16 Ibid, 7 ( 4) • s. 
17 Ibid 8 . s. 
18 Ibid 9. s. 
19 Ibid 10. s. 
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licence, the licensee has a right to surrender the 
prospecting licence in exchange for a mining licence over an 
area the Minister deems adequate for the purpose of mining 
that reservoir or field. 20 
Insofar as mining licences are concerned, the procedural 
regime is not too dissimilar to that applying to prospecting 
licences. 
1 . 21 1cence. 
The Minister has a discretion to grant a mining 
The term of the licence is fixed by the 
Minister, and is divided into "initial" and "specified" 
22 terms. The maximum period for each term is 4 years for a 
initial term, and 40 years for a specified term. Generally 
speaking, the initial term is intended to cover the 
preparation and approval of the work programme. During this 
time, the licensee may not construct any permanent works or 
structures. 23 
The licensee has similar rights to the prospector in 
relation to the rights associated with the particular 
activity licensed, including a duty to respect other users 
of the land, a duty to comply with all other Acts and 
20 Ibid 11. s. 
21 Ibid 12. s. 
22 Ibid 13. s. 
23 Ibid 14A. s. 
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regulations, and an obligation to be subject to an express 
denial of any proprietary rights in the petroleum. 24 There 
are powers available to the Minister to postpone the 
d 1 t f t 1 d . 25 t d eve opmen o ape ro eum iscovery, ore uce the area 
comprised in a prospecting licence or revoke the licence for 
failure to develop the discovery, 26 and to modify or suspend 
. . t. 27 mining opera ions. As with prospecting, there is a 
deposit or bond payable (as security for compliance to the 
terms and conditions of the licence) , 28 and also an annual 
licence fee payable. 29 
Sections 20 to 27 of the Petroleum Act cover general 
provisions relating to licences of both types. Upon 
application by the licensee there is power for the Minister 
to amend a licence (subject to such conditions as thought 
fit) by adding adjoining land to that already comprised in 
the licence. 3° For the purpose of the performance and 
observance of the terms and conditions of the licence, if 
24 Ibid 14. s. 
25 
Ibid 14B. s. 
26 
Ibid 14C. s. 
27 
Ibid 15. s. 
28 Ibid 16. s. 
29 
Ibid 17. s. 
30 
Ibid 20. s. 
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there is more than one licensee, then liability for such 
31 obligations will be joint and several. Licences cannot be 
transferred (except by way of mortgage or other charge) 
without the consent of the Minister. 32 Additionally, it is 
deemed unlawful for a licence holder to enter into, without 
the Minister's consent, any agreement which creates an 
interest in or affects any existing or future licence, 
assigns or deals with an interest in or affects any existing 
or future licence, or imposes an obligation upon the 
licensee relating to the production of the petroleum from 
1 d . d ' th 1 ' 3 3 the an comprise in e icence. Section 24 of the Act 
then provides that "The Minister shall not be concerned with 
the effect in law of any contract, agreement, or arrangement 
consented to by him under the [previous provision]". 
There is a duty for the Secretary of Energy to keep a 
' t f 1 ' 3 4 d ' d d th 1 . ' regis er o icences, an provi e e icensee gives 2 
month's notice in writing in the case of a prospector and 6 
months for a miner, then the licensee may surrender the 
1
. 35 icence. Concerning the Minister's power to revoke a 
31 Ibid 21. s. 
32 Ibid 22. s. 
33 Ibid 23. s. 
34 Ibid 25. s. 
35 Ibid 26. s. 
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licence, if the Minister has reason to believe that the 
licensee has failed to or is not making reasonable efforts 
to comply with the terms and conditions of the licence, the 
Minister may give the licensee notice to remedy such default 
within 90 days after the giving of the notice. 36 Failure by 
the licensee to satisfy the Minister that compliance has 
occurred gives the Minister the right to serve notice that 
within a month from service of notice the licence shall be 
revoked. The notice must state the reasons for the 
d 
. . 37 ec1s1on. The licensee has the right to appeal the 
decision to the Administrative Division of the High Court, 38 
and pending the determination of the appeal, the licence 
shall continue unless it would have expired otherwise by 
1 . f t. 39 eff ux1on o 1me. Naturally, the licensee is liable in 
respect of the licence up until the time of revocation. 40 
Concerning the rights of the Crown, the Minister, on behalf 
of the Crown, may 
36 Ibid 27 ( 1) . s. 
37 Ibid 27 ( 2) . s. 
38 Ibid 27 ( 3) . s. 
39 Ibid 27 ( 4) . s. 
40 Ibid 27 ( 5) • s. 
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(a) grant a licence to himself or otherwise purchase or 
acquire any licence, 
(b) purchase or otherwise acquire any interest in any 
licence, 
(c) sell or otherwise deal with any licence or any 
interest in any licence, 
d . . t' 41 ( ) carry on m1n1ng opera ions, 
(e) do any of the above jointly with any other person 
42 or persons. 
With regard to the right described in (b) above, the 
Minister may authorise the Secretary of Energy or other 
person or persons to act on behalf of the crown, and all of 
the Minister's powers and discretions are consequently 
delegated to such authorised person. 43 
41 Note the extended definition of the term "mining 
operations" in Petroleum Act 1937, s. 2. 
42 Petroleum Act 1937, s. 36 (1). 
43 Ibid s. 36 (2). 
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The Minister is prohibited from prospecting or mining on 
behalf of the Crown without a licence44 , and as far as the 
rights, benefits, and privileges of the Crown~ licensee 
are concerned, the Crown is given equivalent status as that 
of a private person holding such licence. 45 A transfer or 
mortgage to the Crown of any licence does not operate as a 
merger of the interest created by the licence46 and a 
licence held by the Minister on behalf of the Crown is not 
subject to termination by effluxion of time47 and continues 
in force until the Minister declares that the licence has 
been surrendered by means of notice published in the 
48 Gazette. Finally, the Crown (and anyone holding a 
licence on behalf of the Crown) is bound by provisions of 
the Act only insofar as any particular provision expressly 
does so. 49 It seems that the only provisions specifically 
binding the Crown are sections 6, 13, 14A, 28, 29, 30, 31, 
and 32. Sections 28 through to 32 are part of a series of 
provisions denominated "Entry on Land", and are not 
significant for present purposes. 
44 Ibid s. 
45 Ibid s. 
46 Idem. 
47 Ibid s. 
48 Idem. 
49 Ibid s. 
36 (3) and also s. 4 (3). 
36 (4). 
36 (5). 
36 (6). 
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IV. THE COMMERCE ACT 198650 
The Act introduced to New Zealand concepts of "fair" 
competitive trading. Other jurisdictions have long had such 
legislative schemes covering this aspect of commercial 
activity. 51 The long title of the Act reflects an intention 
to"··. promote competition in markets within New Zealand 
"and the Act comprises seven parts: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
the Commerce Commission 
restrictive trade practices 
mergers and takeovers 
control of prices 
authorisations and clearances 
enforcement, remedies and appeals 
miscellaneous provisions. 
One of the definition provisions in the Act defines "goods" 
as including (inter alia) "animals (including fish); 
minerals, trees and crops, whether on, under, or attached to 
land or not; gas and electricity". The implication is that 
50 Generally, see BM Hill & MR Jones Competitive 
Trading in New Zealand: The Commerce Act 1986 (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1986), and Y van Roy Guidebook to New Zealand 
Competition Laws (Commerce Clearing House, Auckland, 1987). 
51 Sherman Act (1890) and Clayton Act (1914) in USA, 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 in England, and Trade 
Practices Act 1974 in Australia. 
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the Act is not necessarily limited to these, and by 
inference, it can be presumed that the Act would apply to 
personal property, and therefore, subject to the limitations 
contained in the Act, the jurisdiction could be extended to 
cover the "chose in action market 11 • 52 
The introductory, jurisdictional provisions include section 
5, called "Application of the Act to the Crown". Section 5 
(1) provides that the Act binds the Crown only in so far as 
the Crown engages in trade. "Trade" is defined as "meaning" 
any trade, business, profession, occupation, activity of 
commerce, or undertaking relating to the supply or 
acquisition of goods or services or to the disposition or 
acquisition of interest in land. "Services" is defined as 
including "any rights (including any rights in relation to, 
and interests in ... personal property), privileges ... granted, 
or conferred in trade53 ... " and "supply" is defined as 
52 Quaere: Would the sale and purchase of other 
"natural resource rights" eg development rights under a 
district scheme, or water rights under the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967 come under the Commerce Act 1986? For 
a theoretical look at possibilities under the latter, see TL 
Anderson A Market for New Zealand's Water (Unpublished 
Manuscript, Centre for Resource Management, University of 
Canterbury, Christchurch, 1988) and TL Anderson & B Sharp 
Ownership and Use Rights for Water and Soil Resources: An 
Analytical Framework (Unpublished Manuscript, Centre for 
Resource Management, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 
1988) . 
53 Note the circularity of the definitions. 
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inclusive of providing, granting, and conferring, in the 
context of the supply of services. 
Section 5 (3) specifies that the Crown cannot be prosecuted 
for an offence under the Act, although under section 5 (4) 
the Commission or a person "directly affected" by a 
contravention of a provision by the Crown can apply to the 
High Court for a declaration that the Crown has contravened 
the provision. Section 6 expressly applies the Act to 
"Crown corporations". 
An interesting saving is contained in section 7. Section 7 
(2) states "Nothing in this Act limits or affects any rule 
of law relating to breaches of confidence". 
A. Restrictive Trade Practices 
For the purposes of analysis of the issues focused upon in 
this paper, the most significant provisions of the Act are 
contained in Part II, called "Restrictive Trade Practices". 
Generally, this part provides for prohibitions on various 
activities that have the purpose or have or are likely to 
have the effect of substantially lessening competition in a 
market. 
- 16 -
Section 27 relates to contracts, arrangements, or 
understandings substantially lessening competition. Section 
28 relates to covenants substantially lessening competition. 
The specific reference to covenants is intended to prohibit 
section 27 activities in dealings of land which may not 
necessarily come within the ambit of "contract, arrangement 
or understanding 11 • 54 Section 29 prohibits contracts, 
arrangements, or understandings containing exclusionary 
provisions. The mischief here is to prevent parties acting 
in collusion to prevent the supply or acquisition of goods 
or services from/to the contracting parties. 
The rationale behind the use of the term "contracts, 
arrangements, and understandings" is to catch a wide range 
of commercial relationships. Obviously, "contracts" 
includes all lawfully enforceable agreements. The extent of 
"arrangements and understandings" would seem to be that 
"arrangements'' cover explicit plans between parties where 
those plans do not necessarily create legal obligations, and 
it can be inferred that "understandings" cover similar 
circumstances, only the arrangements are less overt. 55 
54 Hill, op cit 62. 
55 van Roy, op cit 61. 
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The use of the term "purpose, [or effect or likely effect) 
of substantially lessening competition in a market" is 
evidence of rather vague statutory language. The threshold 
of the test for "purpose" does not seem to be very high: 
there is no defence that the outcome of the activity did not 
actually lessen competition, although the actual effect will 
have some bearing on the determination of the purpose of the 
' 1 t. . t . t. 56 particu ar ac ivi yin ques ion. The inclusion of the 
qualification "likely effect" means that practices 
diminishing potential competition are also prohibited. 
"Substantial" is defined as meaning "real or of 
57 substance". The implication must be that one looks at the 
effect on the market as a whole. For the legislature to 
have omitted this qualification would have made the test too 
wide: the nature of the perfect market is such that if one 
competitor is eliminated, then obviously, competition is 
lessened. 
The heart of this part of the Act is manifest in the phrase 
"competition in a market". These two terms have a 
definition section devoted to them exclusively, 58 defining 
56 Hill, op cit 54. 
57 Ibid, 56. 
58 Commerce Act 1986, s. 3 (8). 
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competition as meaning "workable or effective competition, 
and "market" as meaning "a market· for goods or services 
within New Zealand that may be distinguished as a matter of 
fact and commercial common sense". In broad economic 
terms, 59 a market can be described as a formal or informal 
institution where suppliers of goods and services transact 
with buyers of goods and services, with the ultimate 
objective of all participants being the maximisation of both 
profit and market share. Competition can be simply 
described as the pursuit of maximising the profit and market 
share of the participant. 
Economic theory states that the "perfect competitive market" 
exudes characteristics of substitution (no one participant 
is better than another); perfect information (the 
participants have all relevant knowledge of all products and 
prices); homogeneity of products (there is no qualitative 
choice between them); zero transport costs; and no barriers 
to entry (new buyers and sellers may enter the market at any 
time). The result of perfect competition in a perfect 
market is that the process of supply and demand determines 
that the most efficient products are offered at the lowest 
price with the highest profit. In determining the question 
of competition or market, a court would take cognizance of 
59 See for example, SE Stiegler (ed) A Dictionary of 
Economics and Commerce (Pan, London, 1976). 
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these elements, and look at the facts in light of the 
60 theory. 
Sections 30 to 34 deal with price fixing and are considered 
extraneous to this inquiry, although there is a specific 
exemption of these sections to joint venture pricing. 
Section 35 allows activities coming within sections 27 to 29 
when they are expressed as subject to authorisation by the 
Commerce Commission. Authorisation guarantees the parties 
that the Commission will not proceed against them. 
Generally, the authorisation is made ·on the basis that the 
public benefit outweighs the detriment of the restrictive 
t . 61 prac ice. 
1
. 62 B. Monopo 1es 
Section 36 restricts persons in dominant positions in a 
market from using that dominance to restrict entry to that 
market, or to restrict competitive conduct in that (or 
other) market, or to eliminate another from that market. 
60 Air New Zealand v. Commerce Commission (1985) 1 
NZBCL 102, 262. 
61 van Roy, op cit 58. 
62 See J Land "Monopolisation: The Practical 
Implications of section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986" (1988) 
18 VUWLR 51. 
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Comprehension of the ambit of this section requires an 
examination of the concepts "dominant position in a market". 
From the economic theory of perfect competition, it is not 
difficult to see that often in reality, all the requisite 
elements do not subsist simultaneously. An example of this 
is when infinite substitution is diminished to such an 
extent that certain participants in the market obtain market 
power sufficient to curtail the freedom of choice between 
supplier and consumer. For the purposes of the Act, it is 
probably correct to analyse the particular market in which 
dominance is supposed to exist. This analysis wouid need 
examination of the specific market in terms of its 
particular product, functional, and geographic 
h t . t. 63 c arac eris ics. 
Section 3 (8) of the Act provides for a more comprehensive 
definition of the concept. Essentially, persons are in a 
dominant position in a market when they are a supplier or 
acquirer of goods or services and are in a position to 
exercise a dominant influence over the production, 
acquisition, supply, or price of goods or services in that 
market. Further, in determining the above, further matters 
must be taken into consideration, (generally) that of the 
market share, knowledge, or access to capital/materials of 
63 't van Roy, op ci 50. 
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the person; the extent the person is constrained by 
competitors (including potential ones) in that market; and 
the extent the person is constrained by the conduct of 
suppliers/acquirers of goods or services in that market. 
The remainder of part two of the Act relates to resale price 
maintenance, and again, is not considered particularly 
relevant to this paper. 
C. The Petroleum Act 1937 and the Commerce Act 1986 
In examining the role of the Crown as licensor under the 
Petroleum Act in light of the Commerce Act, the first 
question must be that of jurisdiction of the latter. As 
discussed above, the first hurdle to overcome is that of 
showing that the Crown, in this role, is engaged in trade. 
The recent case of Auckland Regional Authority v. Mutual 
kl d . t) . . t d 64 . d Rental Cars (Aue an A1rpor L1m1 e prov1 es an 
interesting analogy. The case involved the plaintiff 
bringing civil proceedings seeking a declaration in respect 
of ss 27, 29, and 36 of the Commerce Act. The plaintiff was 
under a statutory duty to operate and administer the 
Auckland International Airport, and they had issued licenses 
to two rental vehicle operators. The plaintiff also 
64 
[1987) 2 NZLR 647. 
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contracted with these two businesses to limit the number of 
similar concessions at the airport during the term of the 
licence. The defendant claimed that the passing of the 
Commerce Act 1986 had the effect that the plaintiff was now 
free to provide a concession to them because the contracts 
were in breach of s. 27 (2) of the Act; that the other 
concessionaires were in competition and therefore the effect 
of those contracts (or arrangements) was also in breach of 
s. 29 (1) of the Act; and that the plaintiff was in a 
dominant position in a market and was using that position to 
prevent a party from engaging in competitive conduct in that 
market thereby falling foul of s. 36 of the Act. 
Barker J held that there was no breach of s. 29 because to 
succeed under this head it was necessary to show that the 
arrangement or understanding had a degree of mutuality 
amongst the three parties, and on the facts, this was not 
so. As far ass. 27 was concerned, the finding was that 
there was a market for rental car services at Auckland 
airport, and that the contracts had the effect of 
substantially lessening competition in that market. 
The defendants were also successful in their argument in 
relation to s. 36 of the Act. The argument was along the 
lines of saying that where there is only one supplier of 
goods or services there is a monopoly, and based upon the 
- 23 -
concept of the "bottleneck facility 11 , 65 if a bottleneck 
facility was used to exclude others from competing, that 
exclusion should be eliminated. Reference was made to 
leading United States anti-trust cases, and dicta in Hecht 
66 v. Pro-Football Inc was adopted for the proposition that 
" ... where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by 
would be competitors, those in possession of them must allow 
them to be shared on fair terrns. 1167 The Hecht case then 
noted that the principle should be carefully applied in that 
the essential facility need not be shared if such sharing 
was impractical or inhibited the operator's ability to 
adequately provide the goods or service. 
The application of these principles to the case study seems 
quite apposite. The relevant market is the market for 
mining rights. As long as the rights are transferable 
(albeit subject to the Minister's consent), then trade in 
these rights must form a market. The right can be 
mortgaged, and essentially has all the characteristics of 
any other intangible personal property. The granting of a 
licence by the Crown to itself seems to be an act which 
65 This is where a facility can neither be duplicated 
nor circumvented and through which competitors in a given 
market must have access: ibid, 679. 
66 570 F 2d 982 (1977). 
67 Ibid, 992. 
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excludes all others from the market place. It can be 
argued, however, that the two cases are distinct in that the 
Auckland Regional Authority is required by the Airport 
Authorities Act 1966 to operate the airport as an activity 
of commerce, and therefore falls within the definition of 
"trade". This factor facilitates the application of the 
Commerce Act to the airport concessions situation. 
On the other hand, it could well be argued that the Crown as 
licensor is engaged in trade. As outlined above, "trade" 
means any "undertaking relating to the supply of services" 
and "supply" in relation to services includes "grant". 
"Services" includes any rights (including rights in relation 
to personal property) that are granted in trade. Support 
can be gained from the extended definition of services in 
that it includes the rights, benefits, privileges or 
facilities conferred under a contract conferring rights for 
which remuneration is payable in the form of a royalty, 
tribute levy or similar extraction. In light of section 18 
(2) of the Petroleum Act 1937, which requires the licensee 
under a mining or prospecting licence to pay to the 
Secretary of Energy a royalty in respect of all petroleum 
that is produced from the land comprised in the licence, 
there would be difficulty arguing that the jurisdiction of 
the Commerce Act does not extend to this situation. 
- 25 -
Irrespective of the position of the Crown in its capacity as 
licensor, having issued the mining license to itself, the 
offer to sell the interest in the Ngaere licence must surely 
come within the scope of the restrictive trade practice 
provisions. It is clear the Minister is engaged in trade. 
Similarly, it is clear that if the interest is only being 
offered to the joint venture licensees in adjacent licence 
areas, then there is a prima facie case of restricting entry 
of other persons into a market contrary to s. 36 of the 
Commerce Act, and there is a strong possibility that the 
accepta'nce of the Minister's offer could be seen as a 
contract, arrangement, or understanding having the effect 
of lessening competition in a market thereby being in breach 
of s. 27 of that Act. 
V. PETROLEUM MINING LICENCES AND RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
A. The Political and Economic Environment 
"There is scope for improving efficiency in the public 
sector. This will increase our ability to reduce the 
Government deficit, lower taxes, and provide income 
support and social services for those least able to 
help themselves. In the case of trading operations 
inefficiency can represent a tax on their customers. 
The essence of the problem is that the public sector 
needs to be adapted to meet the management needs of a 
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modern economy. The present environment can be 
frustrating not only for those who have to deal with 
public sector organisations but also for those who work 
in them. 1168 
The present Labour Government has set in train economic and 
public sector reform to a degree previously unknown. 69 With 
the introduction of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 
the government initiated the process of "corporatisation" -
that of converting public sector trading operations into 
limited liability companies, trading in an environment of 
't' t l't 70 competi ive neu ra i y. Competitive neutrality is deemed 
to be attained by imposing private sector performance 
criteria upon the state-owned enterprise, as well as 
deregulating the particular industry so that the state-owned 
enterprise can no longer rely upon the advantages it enjoyed 
71 when it was a part of the Crown. The corporatisation 
process has been restricted to converting into state-owned 
enterprises, state organs which produced goods and services 
capable of sale in the market place. 
68 1 . . t f . . Hon RO Doug as, Minis er o Finance, Economic 
Statement, House of Representatives, 12 December 1985. 
69 See P McKinlay, Corporatisation: the solution for 
state owned enterprise? (Institute of Policy Studies, 
Wellington, 1987). 
7 o Ibid 3. 
71 
Ibid 20. 
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The reform of the public sector has been paralleled with 
similarly vigorous reform in the private sector. Generally 
speaking, this could be described as "deregulation", and 
involves the creation of a competitively neutral environment 
domestically, and also the same environment for domestic 
industries vis-a-vis foreign markets. An example of this is 
the abolishing of certain industry specific subsidies and 
also many import tariffs. As the term implies, deregulation 
also embodies the concept of limited government 
intervention. 
A particular tool of reform has been the Commerce Act 1986. 
This legislation has been described as " ... to promote the 
forces of competition and business rivalry which are so 
important to the operation of effective markets ... [and 
establishes] a general standard of competitive behaviour. 1172 
The Commerce Act 1986 applies to Crown corporations and also 
binds the Crown (albeit with some limitation, which is 
discussed below) . 73 
As seen above, it can be argued that Crown participation in 
prospecting for and mining of petroleum falls within the 
72 Hon DF Caygill, Minister of Trade and Industry, 
Foreword to BM Hill & MR Jones, Competitive trading in New 
Zealand: The Commerce Act 1986 (Butterworths, Wellington, 
1987). 
73 Commerce Act 1986, s.5. 
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general category of a state trading activity. At the very 
least, it can be argued that the mining process, provided it 
is carried out lawfully - generally speaking, within the 
provisions of the licence - creates some sort of inchoate 
property right in the extracted product. 74 The inherent 
nature of a property right is transferability, 75 and a 
priori transferability implies trade. 
Notwithstanding the privatisation of the Petroleum 
Corporation of New Zealand Limited, continued Crown 
participation in these activities represents a significant 
departure from the policy of improving efficiency in the 
public sector, unless perhaps, the Crown does not believe 
that efficiency can be improved in this area. On the basis 
that some of the Crown's activities in the mining of 
petroleum might possibly fall outside the established 
general standard of competitive behaviour, examination is 
required of the Commerce Act 1986 to establish how that 
legislation relates to activities undertaken pursuant to 
74 DE Fisher The legal context of petroleum development 
in New Zealand in Petroleum Development and New Zealand law: 
essays prepared for the Faculty of Law, Victoria University 
of Wellington (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1984). 
75 Insofar as the Petroleum Act 1937 is concerned, 
section 22 allows the transfer of a licence by way of 
mortgage or charge, albeit a rather limited right because 
any transfer by the mortgagee or chargee is subject to the 
consent of the Minister of Energy. 
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other legislation, and in this particular case, the 
Petroleum Act 1937. 
B. The Commerce Act 1986 and Other Legislation 
The general standards of behaviour established under the Act 
relate to restrictive trade practices, mergers and 
takeovers, and control of prices. 76 Of these, the most 
pertinent is that of restrictive trade practices. Part II 
of the Act is devoted to this standard, and provides for 
several categories within this standard: practices 
substantially lessening competition, use of dominant 
position in a market, and resale price maintenance. 
Consistent with the overall intent of the Act, as noted 
above, these provisions are to be of general application. 
For some reason or other, however, there might arise the 
need for the endorsement of a standard of behaviour that is 
lower than that required in general circumstance. These 
might be based upon a social, economic, or technological 
goal which might not be attainable by means of competition. 
Apart from both abuse of dominant position and resale price 
maintenance, under Part V of the Act, the Commerce 
76 Refer n. 50. 
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Commission has the power to authorise all trade practices 
falling within Part II of the Act. 77 In exercising its 
power under Part V, the Commission must have regard to the 
economic policies of the Government when such policies are 
transmitted to it in writing by the Minister of Trade and 
78 Industry. 
Another exception is provided by section 43 of the Act. 79 
This section provides: 
(1) Nothing in this Part [II] of this Act applies in 
respect of any act, matter, or thing that is, or is of 
a kind, specifically authorised by any enactment or 
Order in Council made under any Act. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this 
section, an enactment or Order in Council does not 
provide specific authority for any act, matter, or 
thing if it provides in general terms for that act, 
matter, or thing, notwithstanding that the act, matter, 
or thing requires or may be subject to approval or 
authorisation by a Minister of the Crown, statutory 
77 Commerce Act 1986, s.58. 
78 Ibid s.26. 
79 See Hill, op cit 94, and van Roy, op cit 18. 
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body or a person holding any particular office, or in 
the case of a rule made or an act, matter, or thing 
done pursuant to any enactment, approval or 
authorisation by Order in Council. 
For present purposes, section 43(3) of the Act, which 
relates to legislation covering sharebrokers and real estate 
agents, will be regarded as being irrelevant. 
Firstly, note should be taken of the phrase "act, matter, or 
thing" which seems to indicate that activities wider than 
that of "engaging in conduct" (this latter term being 
generally the operative phrase used in Part II of the Act) 
require "specific authority". Further, the term "enactment 
or Order in Council" excludes other instruments of the 
Legislature or the Executive and also excludes Ministerial 
acts of authority. 
The exact scope of the expression "specific authority" has 
yet to be judicially defined in New Zealand. The equivalent 
legislation existing prior to the Act, The Commerce Act 
1975, contained some provisions from which some activities 
were exempt if so "expressly authorised" by any other Act. 
The application of this term was raised in His Master's 
- 32 -
· c ) • ·t d s· 80 VoiceNZ L1m1 e v. 1mmons. In that case, the 
Plaintiff sought to justify a certain resale price 
maintenance scheme because such a practice was possible 
under a statutory right to acquire a compulsory copyright on 
payment of a royalty when a gramophone record had been 
manufactured. It was held that the "other" legislation 
(Copyright Act 1962) did not expressly authorise an 
agreement or arrangement between wholesalers of gramophone 
records to fix resale prices: there was not even authority 
by necessary implication let alone express authority. 81 
Even although the "necessary implication" test was clear:ly 
obiter dicta, Haslam J suggested that this test required an 
inquiry into the nature and purpose of the "other" 
legislation. 
Two further cases on this point arose in 1980. The first, 
ABC Containerline NV v. New Zealand Wool Board81 dealt with 
a situation where in consideration for a reduced rate, the 
Defendant ("NZWB"), agreed with a third party to give the 
third party the exclusive right to ship all wool from New 
Zealand to Europe. After examination of the legislation 
under which NZWB purported to exercise the power to enter 
BO [1960) NZLR 25. 
81 Ibid at 29. 
81 
[1980) 1 NZLR 327. 
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such an arrangement, Davison CJ took the view that despite 
there being no express authority for NZWB to restrict 
shipment through a particular organisation, there was 
sufficient authority for NZWB to do so in order for it to 
. f t. 82 carry out its unc ions. The upshot of this decision is 
that greater weight was to be placed on the word "authority" 
as opposed to the word "express". 
The second case, Stock Exchange Association of New Zealand 
. . 83 . 1 d h k . v. Commerce Commission invo ve t e Stoc Exchange making 
. a rule that no member should have a branch office. It was 
conceded that such a prohibition came within the ambit of a 
restricted trade practice as defined in the Commerce Act 
1975. White J held firstly that the word "Act" in the 
phrase "expressly authorised by any Act" included rules 
84 validly made under a particular enactment and secondly 
that the phrase required that a trade practice needs to be 
merely expressly authorised by the other Act, as opposed to 
being expressly stated, so as to be exempt85 . This case 
obviously supports the view of the Chief Justice in ABC 
Containerline NV (supra). 
82 Ibid 385. 
83 [1980] 1 NZLR 663. 
84 Ibid 665. 
85 Ibid 668. 
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The effect of such an interpretation as that referred to 
above was that authority to indulge in otherwise restricted 
trade practices was capricious in effect, and offered the 
government little flexibility in terms of allowing certain 
practices to continue in accordance with any particular 
policy for non-competition. A possible solution to the 
latter would have been to include a general dispensing power 
within the Act. The capricious effect came about because 
many statutory bodies may not have been able to refer their 
specific trade practice to an express statutory power, 
particularly in a heavily regulated economic climate. 
A further by-product of such reasoning is that the scope of 
the Commerce Commission's jurisdiction and power to 
authorise particular practices in specific cases was 
severely limited. It can be well argued that the Commission 
is the appropriate forum for determining these matters, 
particularly in light of the provision for the Minister to 
direct the Commission to have regard to the economic 
policies of the Government. A countervailing argument might 
be that the Minister's power could be too narrowly stated, 
as there might be some other matters which he might want the 
Commission to have regard to, and not necessarily limit the 
advice to that of economic matters only. 
The Act, when passed in 1986, seemed to cover these matters 
by substituting the word "expressly" in the phrase 
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"expressly authorised" with the word "specifically". As 
stated above, the scope of the provision has had no judicial 
consideration in New Zealand. In Australia, an equivalent 
provision can be found in The Trade Practices Act 1974, and 
the Federal Court of Australia was called upon to determine 
this issue in Re Ku-ring-gai Co-operative Building Society 
(No.12) Limited Anor86 . This case involved two building 
societies wanting to impose (by rule) upon its members, 
where members were borrowers whom had secured their loans 
with mortgages, a condition that the mortgaged property had 
to be insured with a particular nominated insurer. By 
regulation, a building society was required to include 
certain matters in its rules, two of which were the manner 
in which insurance of any premises the subject of a mortgage 
to the society is to be effected, and whether it is required 
to be effected with an insurance body specified by the 
society. It was held that even although there might be 
legislative power to do something which would include a 
restricted trade practice, that is insufficient power to 
legitimate an activity which is otherwise something which is 
done under that authority but nevertheless amounts to a 
restricted trade practice: 
86 22 ALR 621. 
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" ... the laws of a State do not usually trouble to give 
legislative affirmation of the lawfulness of acts or 
things which are not otherwise proscribed, but a 
legislative assumption of the lawfulness of an act or 
thing is not tantamount to a specific authorization or 
approval of that act or thing: What is necessary is 
that the State law should exhibit a specific 
legislative intention to authorize or approve the act 
or thing, even though that act or thing would not - but 
for the provisions of the Trade Practices Act - be 
unlawful. 1187 
It could be said that this decision is too harsh, and that 
where the legislature wishes to legitimate a practice for 
some reason other than to fulfill economic policies, then 
specific (in the strict sense of the word) legislation would 
have to be promulgated. 
c. Specific Authority and the Petroleum Act 1937 
Taking a view that the application of the Commerce Act 1986 
is limited in relation to the Petroleum Act 1937 to the 
extent that it only applies to situations where the Crown is 
a participant as a licensee, there seems to be little area 
87 
Per Brennan J, ibid at 636. 
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where the Crown would be subject to the statutory imposed 
standards of good behaviour. The areas most likely to be at 
risk are in the post-discovery period. 
Under the Petroleum Act, the Minister has power to postpone 
the development of a petroleum discovery if he is satisfied 
that the rate at which the petroleum to be be produced from 
that discovery is contrary to the national interest88 . A 
licensee may elect to have the licence deferred or to have 
the licence surrendered. Where the licence is held by more 
than one holder, the Minister may require a holder who 
elects to surrender the right to transfer the interest in 
the surrendered portion to another person who is approved by 
the Minister and the other holders of the licence. 
A similar power exists for the Minister to reduce the area 
comprised in a prospecting area89 This may be exercised if 
the Minister is satisfied that there has been a discovery, 
and the licensee is not carrying out appraisal work or 
applied for a mining licence, and failure to develop the 
discovery would be contrary to the national interest. 
Having exercised that discretion, the Minister must give 
notice to the licensee that unless the licensee applies for 
88 Petroleum Act 1937, s.14B. 
89 b'd I 1 s.14C. 
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a mining license, and makes every endeavour to complete a 
work programme, the Minister may reduce the area of land 
comprised in the licence or revoke the licence. Where the 
Minister is satisfied that some but not all of the holders 
of a licence are prepared to comply with the requirement of 
making a mining licence application and implementing a work 
programme, the Minister can require a holder deemed not 
prepared to comply to transfer that holder's interest in the 
licence to another who is approved by the Minister and the 
other holders of the licence. 
It seems quite clear that where the Crown is one of the 
"other holders" of a license subject to one of these powers, 
then the process of approving the transferee would be 
subject to the Commerce Act standards. In applying the 
reasoning of the Ku-ring-gai case, there is certainly no 
specific provision in the Petroleum Act for a licensee to 
approve a transferee in such a manner so as to (for example) 
prevent a person from engaging in competitive conduct, or 
for the purpose of restricting the acquisition of goods or 
services by someone. 
Another area of concern could possibly arise under sections 
22 and 23 of the Petroleum Act. These provisions restrict 
the transfer of licences and creation of interests in 
licences by licensees insofar as such actions must be 
subject to the consent of the Minister, and the Minister in 
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giving such consent may impose any terms and conditions as 
the Minister thinks fit. Upon the assumption that the 
exercise of discretion by the Minister may not necessarily 
be a case of the Minister being "engaged in trade", if the 
effect of the decision is a breach of a trade practice, then 
the question arises as to what is the effect of such a 
breach upon other persons party to that practice: does the 
fact that the Crown is immune from the breach mean that the 
other persons would be also? 
The answer must be that a Court would be able to grant 
relief against the persons party to the practice. Section 5 
of the Commerce Act exempts the Crown, not the practice it 
may be involved in. Further, it appears that in terms of 
sanctioning under the exemptions and authorisation 
provisions of the Act, the practice rather than the person 
involved, is the object of the legislation. Notwithstanding 
this, given the width of section 43 (2) of the Commerce Act, 
participation in an activity which would breach the imposed 
standard irrespective of Ministerial approval would still 
taint all parties. 
A clear application of the Commerce Act is where the 
Minister acts pursuant to section 36(1) (c) of the Petroleum 
Act whereby the Minister, on behalf of the Crown, may "sell 
or otherwise deal with any licence or any interest in any 
licence". There is no express provision authorising the 
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Minister to sell or otherwise deal in a manner in breach of 
a prohibited trade practice, although again, the Minister 
may authorise the Secretary of Energy or any other person to 
acquire the licence or interest in the licence on such tenns 
as he thinks fit. Obviously, the operative words being 
"sell or otherwise deal with" must immediately raise the 
inference that the Minister is "engaged in trade". 
D. Consequences 
Even taking a narrow view of the question as to whether a 
Minister in exercising a discretion under the petroleum 
mining licensing regime might or might not fall within the 
scope of the necessary qualifying activity under the 
Commerce Act (engaging in trade), if one were to accept the 
reasoning of the Federal Court of Australia in the 
Ku-ring-gai case, then there is ample scope for the 
proposition that the Petroleum Act gives little "specific 
authority" exempting the Crown from the operation Part II of 
the Commerce Act whenever the Minister acts pursuant to 
section 36 of the Petroleum Act. Taking the matter further, 
it follows that the wider the stance taken on whether or not 
the Minister is engaged in trade, the greater becomes the 
application of the Commerce Act to the petroleum mining 
licensing regime. A logical extension of this is that the 
Commerce Act applies to bind the Minister even when the 
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Minister is not only acting as a licensee, but also when the 
Minister is acting as a licensor. 
The result of the above is that there is a convenient 
balance between the the Minister's power to determine 
matters pertaining to the encouragement and regulation of 
mining for petroleum within the discretions available under 
the Petroleum Act, on the one hand, and the authority of the 
Commerce Commission to sanction certain activities which 
would otherwise be prohibited under the Commerce Act on the 
other. Each decision maker will be competent to make a 
decision on that particular subject matter and that 
particular forum is, in this case, appropriate. The only 
fetter upon the Commerce Commission is when the Minister of 
Trade and Industry gives written notice of a particular 
economic policy of which the Commission must have regard to, 
and depending upon the view point (interventionists would 
argue other policies should also be the subject of such 
notices), this seems a far more flexible mechanism to exempt 
activities inconsistent with competition which the 
Government may wish to subsist and preferable to that of ad 
hoe legislation on a level of specificity sufficient to 
overcome the Ku-ring-gai test. 
In terms of the broad economic and public sector reform, it 
may be that given both the size of the economy and the 
strategic importance of petroleum, the current situation in 
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respect of a continued dual role by the Crown as both 
licensee and licensor mostly subject to the prohibitions 
under the Commerce Act enables the pursuit of efficiency. 
With regard to the trading of rights in other resources, the 
Commission's jurisdiction to authorise activities may well 
require reduction in the sense that the Commission may well 
be required to have regard to other matters, eg the rights 
of existing holders, the obligations of the Crown and the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
VI. LEGAL AND EQUITABLE OBLIGATIONS 
A. The Crown, Petroleum Mining, and Contract Law 
To the extent that the Crown may participate as a licensee 
in both prospecting and mining as provided for ins. 36 of 
the Petroleum Act, inevitably, from both the high risk and 
the huge capital outlay involved in this type of activity, 
when exercising its rights under this provision, the Crown 
usually enters joint venture agreements with others, as 
would be the case for most other parties wishing to partake 
in prospecting or mining. Leaving aside the role contract 
law plays in the licensing aspect of petroleum mining, the 
privileged position of the Crown raises some interesting 
issues. Firstly, there is the question as to the extent to 
which the Crown may contract, and secondly, to what effect 
the law gives to such contracts on the assumption that the 
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courts wish to give effect to such principles as sanctity of 
contract. Closely related to these questions is a third 
area of concern, that of the issue related to the role 
equitable principles apply where the (traditional) common 
law principles and remedies become inappropriate. 
Notwithstanding some views to the effect that the Crown 
might not possess a common law power to enter into 
90 contract, the scope of the Crown's contractual powers are 
nevertheless often derived from statute. In the context of 
petroleum mining, provision is given by section 15 of the 
Ministry of Energy Act 1977 for the Minister of Energy (on 
behalf of the Crown) to "carry on any business relating to 
(inter alia) exploration 11 , 91 and in so doing for the 
purposes of that provision, may enter "agreements, contracts 
92 or arrangements" . Further, the Crown may, acting through 
any Department of State, enter contracts or arrangements to 
provide goods and services "at the request of any 
undertaking" referred to in subsection (1) (which refers to 
various general activities related to energy exploration, 
93 development, and use). This statutory origin gives rise 
90 Seen. 5 at 75ff. p. 
91 Ministry of Energy Act 1977, 15 ( 1) . s. 
92 Ibid, 15 ( 11) . s. 
93 It is interesting to note that the Crown does not 
directly enter into any contract. 
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to conflict as to the principle of the freedom to contract 
on the one hand, and the extent to which such a legislative 
derived power is subject to judicial review on the other. 
When the Crown exercises its statutory power to enter a 
contract, that power is necessarily limited by the enabling 
legislation. In the petroleum mining arena then, the Crown 
might find itself in a rather difficult position if the 
contract being entered was not to "carry on a business" 
within the ambit of section 15 of the Ministry of Energy 
Act, or similarly, if the agreement, contract, or deed 
entered into is not for the purposes of section 15 of that 
Act, then in the absence of any common law power to 
contract, the contract might well be void ab initio. 
Additional problems arise, the first of which is that of the 
principle in administrative law to the effect that the Crown 
may not enter into a contract which in any way fetters the 
b t d 't 94 powers es owe upon i . The application of this 
principle might (for example) result in a court not implying 
a term which has this effect. 95 A second problem is that of 
the status of the Crown as a contracting party. In view of 
94 · ' t . t 1 t . . t 1 Birkdale Dis ric E ec rici y Supp y Company v. 
Southport Corporation [1926) AC 355. 
95 · 11 · . . See for example, Cory (Wi iam) & Son Limited v. 
London Corporation [1951) 2 KB 476. 
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section 5 (k) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 to the 
effect that rights of the Crown may not be affected by any 
provision or any enactment in any Act unless expressly 
stated has the consequence that any other party to a 
contract with the Crown will be disadvantaged to the extent 
that legislation not expressly affecting the rights of the 
Crown impinges upon the performance of the contract some 
way. A third matter for consideration is the rule of 
construction that in the interpretation of grants from the 
Crown, the pro proferentum rule applies and therefore the 
grant is to be construed in favour of the Crown with the 
consequence that a grant could not be made unless without 
mb . 't 96 a 1gu1 y. 
All these matters certainly weigh against equality of 
bargaining powers, and in a commercial (or "business", to 
use the argot of the Ministry of Energy Act) environment, a 
party contracting with the Crown would, as a matter of 
prudence, factor into the consideration this added risk 
element. The overall effect then, is that from a commercial 
perspective, the Crown might be actually disadvantaged by 
parties contracting with it adopting such a strategy to the 
extent that the "privileges" and the uncertainties 
96 Viscountess Rhondda's Claim [1922) 2 AC 339. 
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associated with the Crown's contractual position might 
impede rather than facilitate commercial enterprise. 
B. Joint Ventures 
As stated earlier, the most common modus operandi in 
petroleum mining is by way of joint venture. The main 
. . f . . t 97 . th b characteristic o Join ventures is at y way of an 
agreement between two or more parties, there is (a) amongst 
the participants, common ownership of the asset to be 
exploited, (b) an operator is appointed to incur expenditure 
on behalf of the participants, and only the operator may 
bind the joint venture, (c) provision is made for the 
sharing of expenditure and participation in the benefits 
accrued from the venture, (d) a denial of any partnership 
amongst the participants (thereby overcoming liability for 
other participants as in partnership law), and 
(e) confirmation that the purpose of the association is to 
produce a "product". 
The practical benefits of this vehicle are several. It goes 
without saying that the spreading of the (high) risk is of 
utmost importance. The party (or a third party in some 
97 . 1 d See EM Kelly (ed), Minera an Petroleum Development 
in New Zealand: The Commercial Framework (A series of 
papers), Energy and Natural Resources Law Association of New 
Zealand Inc, Wellington, 1987, at p.l. 
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cases) with the greatest expertise in such matters can carry 
out the administrative functions of the venture (eg 
preparation and implementation of budgets, disseminating 
information, planning and provision of all services and 
materials etc). 
The concept of the joint venture is not without difficulty 
however. 98 One of the basic concepts behind the joint 
venture is the denial of partnership. To begin with, 
judicial authority to the effect that there is a difference 
between the two beasts is sparse. Further, even if there is 
valid concept, the drafting of the joint venture agreement 
will require a great deal of care to avoid a finding that 
the relationship between the parties is in fact a joint 
venture in that there should be no expression of joint 
profits or the profits of the joint venture. There are also 
practical difficulties with the joint venture mode, 
especially in the (later) development stage, particularly 
with regard to financing and taxation. Lastly, there are 
also issues in relationship to the principles of agency and 
how they apply to the extent to which the operator may bind 
the joint venturers. 
98 b'd I 1 at p. 9. 
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To ascertain the validity of the proposition that an 
unincorporated association in the form a joint venture is 
not a partnership, an examination first must be directed to 
the Partnership Act 1908, which ascribes to the relationship 
which subsists between persons carrying on a business in 
common with a view to profit, the status of a partnership. 99 
It seems then, that the prime elements for a partnership are 
(a) contractual obligations between the parties, (b) a 
business purpose, (c) an enterprise carried on in common 
(each party is able to bind the other), and (d) a view to 
f 't 100 pro i. 
At first blush, it would seem that the concept of joint 
ventures falls squarely within this formula. In a recent 
Australian case, United Dominion Corporation Limited v. 
Bryan Pty Limited & Others101 obiter dicta indicated that a 
differentiation could be made between a joint venture and a 
partnership insofar as a joint venture might survive the 
partnership net (particularly the aspect of profit) if the 
objective of the joint venture is to simply generate a 
product to be shared amongst the parties to the joint 
venture. The logic proceeds along the lines that (in a 
99 Partnership Act 1908, s. 4. 
100 t. l See Na iona Insurance Company of New Zealand Ltd 
v. Bray [1934] GLR 185. 
lOl (1985) AIJR 676. 
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petroleum mining context) the parties share expenses arising 
from an activity undertaken in common to exploit a 
particular opportunity (privilege to prospect or mine) with 
a view to individually deriving a portion of the outcome 
from the (prospecting or mining) activity, and therefore 
because the profit (or loss or whatever - this is entirely 
up to the individual party) accrues to the individual 
participant, there is no collective view to profit sharing. 
As far as the position of the Crown goes, especially in 
resp'ect of its role as a joint venturer partaking in a 
prospecting or mining licence, the above analysis might 
present some impediment. It should be recalled that in the 
context of petroleum mining, the Crown may contract for the 
purpose of carrying on any business relating to (inter alia) 
1 t . f 102 exp ora ion o energy. It must be concluded that the 
term "business" implies at the very least, recovery of 
expenses, and more than likely, the objective of attaining 
"normal profit". "Normal profit" can be described as a term 
used by economists to reflect the concept of the amount 
required for an entrepreneur to continue in a particular 
activity in much the same way profit in relation to the 
enterprise is similar to the relationship interest has to 
capital. 
102 See n. 91. 
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If the Crown may only enter an agreement, contract or deed 
for the purpose of carrying on any "business", then it might 
be said that the Crown cannot participate in a joint venture 
because the whole purpose of the joint venture is to not 
make profit. Incongruously, section 15 (1) (b) of the 
Ministry of Energy Act 1977 specifically allows the Minister 
of Energy to acquire interests in and participate in any 
joint venture, despite the general requirement that this 
should be in pursuit of carrying on a business. The maxim 
generalia specialibus non derogant must provide some comfort 
to the Crown under these circumstances. 
Some concern must be raised in relation to the effect of a 
court finding a joint venture in which the Crown had 
acquired an interest or was otherwise participating in was 
not a joint venture at all, but was in fact a partnership. 
In terms of the Ministry of Energy Act, there is provision 
in section 15 (1) (a) for the Minister to participate, on 
behalf of the Crown, in or acquire interests in any 
partnership, so at least in such a case the Crown would be 
prima facie acting intra vires its statutory powers. The 
Crown would then (like its fellow joint venturers) be faced 
with the unanticipated (in fact deliberate provision for the 
avoidance thereof) possibility of assuming the liability of 
its partners and the operator, and any other consequences 
flowing from the relationship of partnership. 
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No doubt, there would be an argument for relief under the 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 or at least reliance upon the 
equitable remedy of rectification103 however, it is 
difficult to conceive of exactly what it is that a court 
could rectify in such a circumstance. Analogously, the 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 can hardly be relied upon to 
create a legal entity which has had no prior legal 
recognition. The Illegal Contracts Act 1970 would be of 
equal assistance. There would be few obstacles to finding a 
joint venture agreement to be "illegal" merely because it is 
an attempt to create a corporate being which is neither 
partnership nor company. 
All in all, it is not difficult to see the great likelihood 
of the joint ventures concept remaining without lawful 
recognition, and the consequences that this may have on the 
parties attempting to rely upon its legitimacy seem to 
. t. . t d 104 remain unan icipa e. Surprisingly, there is little 
litigation on this matter, the more so when one considers 
the large outlays involved. 
103 See Dundee Farm Limited v. Banbury Holdings Limited 
[1978] 1 NZLR 647. 
104 Perhaps the parties should expressly provide for 
contingent liabilities in the event the "no partnership" 
clause is deemed invalid. 
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In terms of the case study, it is difficult to make any 
definitive statements about the contractual liability of the 
parties without perusing the joint venture agreement itself. 
Like much of the technical data associated with this 
industry, the actual agreements seem to attract a high level 
of sensitivity to disclosure. One can assume that the 
agreement would be based upon the British National Oil 
Corporation standard operating agreement. 105 
As far as confidential information is concerned, it can be 
assumed that there is provision for the participants to 
share data and information amongst themselves, perhaps with 
the qualification that the sharing only occur if that data 
and information relates to the particular licence area and 
particular operation. There would probably be an obligation 
upon the parties to not divulge any of this data and 
information to any third party, and this obligation would 
probably survive for a set period (eg five years) the 
discontinuance of the contractual term. The exceptions to 
this duty to not disclose would most likely be (a) where 
disclosure is otherwise required by law, (b) by consensual 
decision in accordance with whatever procedure there is for 
decision making, (c) to affiliates, possible transferees of 
any interest in the venture, consultants and advisers, and 
105 Seen. 5 at p. 85ff. 
lA\/\ l i(j!C<AA't 
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financiers (although disclosure under each of these 
circumstances would probably require a prior undertaking by 
the recipient to similar effect as this duty), and (d) where 
the data and information have lawfully come into the public 
domain. 
In terms of the contractual exception to the obligation to 
maintain confidence on the grounds of "disclosure otherwise 
by law", one must conclude that the Plaintiffs would fail on 
this ground. Even if it could be argued that the Crown (by 
way of the Minister) ill@ joint venturer and licensee was a 
separate entity to that of the Crown (by way of the 
Minister) ill@ regulatory body, then the disclosure might 
well be said to be required by law: Regulation 7, Petroleum 
Regulation 1978, SR 1978/255. It would seem illogical, 
however, that there has been any disclosure in the literal, 
ordinary sense of the word. No information has passed to 
any third party. 
c. The Doctrines of Equity 
As far as any equitable doctrines applying to the situation, 
one outcome of a court ascertaining that the joint venture 
is actually a partnership is the spectre of a fiduciary duty 
being imposed upon each partner towards each of the other 
partners. Even although the relationship amongst partners 
might not always be one such that a fiduciary relationship 
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can be founded, 106 nonetheless, it is more than trite to say 
it is established law that on the basis of good faith, a 
partner will be restrained from making personal profit at 
the expense of the firm. 107 
1. Fiduciary duty 
As a general proposition, it can be stated that where there 
is a relationship between people such that it would be 
reasonable to discern that one party places substantial 
trust or confidence in any other party in the relationship, 
then a fiduciary duty between the parties will be 
. d 108 recognise . It has been acknowledged that in many cases, 
the scope of a fiduciary's obligation may not be easily 
delineated, but within that scope, the nature of the 
obligations is clear. 109 One of the most elementary 
obligations of a fiduciary is that if, by reason of his 
fiduciary position, he acquires an interest in property, he 
106 See Aas v. Benham (1891) 2 Ch 244 holding a partner 
is not accountable to the partnership for profit derived 
from a personal business which is outside the scope of the 
business in which the partnership is involved. 
107 Thomson's trustee v. Heaton Anors (1974) 1 All ER 
1239. 
108 Coleman v. Myers (1977) 2 NZLR 255. 
109 RP Meagher, WMC Gummow, JRF Lehane, Equity, 
doctrines and remedies (2 ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1984), 
at p. 125. 
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must hold that interest on trust for the beneficiaries. 110 
This duty was further expanded into general principles in 
Boardman v. Phipps111 where the House of Lords held (inter 
alia) that the trustee in such a situation must disgorge any 
benefit derived from acquiring that interest, irrespective 
of bona fide intent, and even though the trust could not 
have obtained the benefit. In the event of breach, the 
beneficiaries are entitled to recover not only the exploited 
property, but also any gains derived therefrom, and gives 
the beneficiary priority over the fiduciary's creditors. 
Further, it was clear in Boardman that information per se is 
capable of being trust property for the purpose of a 
constructive trust. There is also "overwhelming mass of 
authority 11112 for the principle that a purchase of trust 
property by a trustee from himself or himself and other 
trustees is voidable at the instance of the beneficiaries. 
In the case study, the joint venture obviously went to 
considerable expense and undertook high levels of risk to 
prospect the land, thereby producing the "property" of great 
commercial potential and the information associated with 
that was the most tangible manifestation of that potential. 
110 Keech v. Sandford (1726) EqCasAbr 741. 
111 [1967] 2 AC 4 6. 
112 Meagher, cit 140, citing Ex parte James (1803) 8 op 
Ves 337. 
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It would not be hard to envisage the imposition of a 
fiduciary duty in relation to the use of that "property". 
There would be most likely a clear contractual obligation 
creating a fiduciary relationship between the joint 
venturers in relation to confidential information. By 
issuing a mining licence to himself, the Minister was 
obviously acquiring an interest in the trust property (ie 
the knowledge of and the extent of the discovery). As far 
as any "purchase" of trust property by a trustee, there was 
none, and the acquisition is almost tantamount to 
misappropriation. The probability of equitable intervention 
is high. 
2. Breach of confidence 
Even if there can be no fiduciary duty construed, there is 
an obvious situation where the joint venturers will have an 
equitable duty to each other, and that is in respect of 
confidential information. Broadly stated, the principle is 
that "a person who has confidential information belonging to 
another may be restrained by injunction from using it 
without the owner's consent 11 • 113 
113 Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterworths, 
London, 1980) vol. 16. Equity, para. 1455, p. 979. 
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The distinction between any equitable duty of confidence 
owed by a person holding confidential information as a 
opposed to that owed under fiduciary duties arising from a 
trust (albeit under construction), basically, is that the 
two areas have into developed into separate fields. The 
former duty has developed as a particular branch of the law 
relating to the latter, and that the technical limitations 
of the latter are less applicable. 114 The diversion arose 
as a result of the separate jurisdictions within the law of 
equity. The jurisdictions were three in all. The first, 
exclusive jurisdiction, was whereby the matter was something 
only a court of equity could issue remedy. Secondly, there 
was concurrent jurisdiction, which covered matters able to 
be dealt with by both courts of equity and common law. 
Auxiliary jurisdiction was the third, under which the Court 
of Equity exercised jurisdiction to facilitate a claim of 
legal rights. 115 The law pertaining to breach of confidence 
has its origins in the exclusive jurisdiction, but has 
evolved so that, depending upon the remedy sought, it can 
now be seen to also operate in the auxiliary jurisdiction. 
114 Meagher, op. cit. 825. 
115 Ibid. 9. 
- 58 -
The parameters of the duty were expressed by Megarry Jin 
Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Limited116 in that there are 
three prerequisites: (a) the information had to have some 
characteristic implying confidence, (b) the information must 
have been communicated in circumstances "importing an 
obligation of confidence"; and (c) the information is not to 
be used without authorisation. 
In terms of the intrinsic confidential quality of the 
information, information which is not in the public domain 
would fall within the category of protected information. 11~ 
Other information falling under this head is information 
which is used by the recipient as a "springboard" for 
activities detrimental to the confidant, even after the 
information is public: the recipient was not allowed a "head 
t t " 118 s ar . Secrecy alone, however, may not give information 
sufficient quality of confidentiality to come within this 
prescription, and examples have been "know-how" in the form 
of sales methods which did not amount to "trade secrets" 119 , 
116 [1969] RPC 41. 
117 Saltman Engineering Co v. Campbell Engineering Co 
[1963] RPC 203, and AB Consolidated Limited v. Europe 
Strength Food Co [1978] NZLR 595 (CA). 
118 . . . d 'ld Terrapin Limite v. Bui ers Supply Co (Hayes) 
Limited [1967] RPC 375, Aquaculture Corporation v. NZ Green 
Mussel Company Limited Anors (1986) 1 NZBCL 102,567. 
119 1· 'k d' . . ·t d S imgui Bo i Design Limi e v. AT Pargeter Anor 
(Unreported) Auckland Registry, CP43//86. 
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and in the form of formulae for and application of cleaning 
chemicals (insofar as the chemicals were readily available 
1 . t. ) 12 0 and the app 1ca ion was commonsense. At the other end 
of the spectrum, information which is conceptually simple 
might still be worthy of protection, and ideas in relation 
d t 1 . . 121 1. f h. to propose e ev1s1on programs exemp 1 y t is. 
The second requirement relates to the circumstances in which 
the information was acquired. The test adopted was that of 
the "reasonable man 11122 and in Coco (supra), Megarry J 
expressed (at page 48) it to mean 
11 ... if the circumstances are such that any reasonable 
man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the 
information would have realised upon reasonable grounds 
the information was being given to him in confidence, 
then this should suffice to impose upon him the 
equitable obligation of confidence." 
12 O · 1 ' ) . ' t d 11 S . th Ce1 1ng Care (NZ L1m1 e Anor v. Russe mi 
(Unreported) Auckland Registry, CP1337/83. 
121 l , , , Talbot v. General Te ev1s1on Corporation Pty 
Limited [1981] RPC 1, and Fraser Anors v. Thames Television 
Limited Anors [1983] 2 All ER 101. 
122 A rather strange concept given the equitable nature 
of the action, particularly in view of the common law 
origins of the concept. 
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This requirement has since been found to apply in situations 
where the information is given pursuant to a contract, as in 
Saltman (supra). The third element, unauthorised use, is 
self explanatory, save the question as to whether the 
supplier of the information has suffered any detriment is 
within the scope of this requirement, although, naturally, 
in most cases, proceedings brought by the owner of the 
information would be unlikely if there has been no detriment 
suffered. 
Reviewing the case study on the above analyt~cal framework, 
there seems to be a clear breach. The information regarding 
the discovery of hydrocarbons could not be anything less 
than of confidential in nature, especially if the 
information had not entered the public domain. The 
information was acquired by the Crown initially as a joint 
venturer, and it is likely that the joint venture agreement 
would have raised the obligation to retain such information 
in confidence. The fact that the Crown issued a licence to 
itself based upon the information may not in itself be 
necessarily a case of unauthorised use, however,it could be 
argued that the information, being the property of the joint 
venture, required the authorisation of the joint venture 
prior to any other use. 
VII. PETROLEUM MINING LICENCES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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As seen above, the Minister of Energy may grant licences at 
his discretion. In respect of the case study, the joint 
123 h ld ' . t t . . venturers o ing in eres sin PML 38140 (Waihapa) have 
filed proceedings in the High Court (Wellington) 124 seeking 
judicial review of the Minister's decisions (a) to deny an 
application by the joint venture to extend the then current 
licence to encompass the Ngaere field, (b) to grant himself 
a mining licence over a licence area almost identical to the 
area which the joint venture wished to extend PML 38140, and 
(c) to sell the Minister's PML, and in doing so, inviting 
the joint venturers to negotiate with him to this end. The 
relief sought is a declaration that the decisions are 
invalid and that the Minister ought not implement them. 
As far as the grounds for review are concerned, the 
Plaintiffs are relying upon the bases that (a) the decisions 
were made for an improper purpose, (b) the Minister had 
regard to irrelevant consideration, (c) the Minister failed 
to have regard to or give due weight to relevant 
considerations, (d) the joint venture's legitimate 
expectation that an extension would be granted was not 
123 t 1 t. . . t d Pe rocorp Exp ora ion Limi e, Petrocorp 
Exploration (Taranaki) Limited, Payzone Exploration Limited, 
Southern Petroleum No Liability, Nomeco New Zealand 
Exploration Company, Bligh Oil & Minerals (NZ) Limited, and 
Carpentaria Exploration Company (NZ) Limited. 
124 Reference CP No 613/88. 
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fulfilled, and (e) the decisions were unfair or 
unreasonable. Without knowing the specific facts, a 
cursory assessment of the issues can provide some 
conclusions. 
A. Improper Purpose. 
Under the rubric of improper purpose, if an entity with 
statutory powers uses that power for a purpose for which the 
statute has not authorised, then a court may review such a 
decision and find such use as invalid: Padfield v. Minister 
f . lt 125 o Agr1cu ure . In order to establish exactly for what 
purpose the Minister may use his discretion in granting 
mining licences to himself under the Petroleum Act, a return 
to the analysis of that Act reveals that a mining licence is 
granted to authorise the licensee to "mine for petroleum on 
whole or any part or parts of the land referred to in the 
1 , t' II 126 app 1ca ion. The licence may be granted upon such terms 
and conditions as the Minister may in his discretion 
'f 127 spec1 y. 
125 l 1· [1968] AC 997, a so see Row 1ng Anor 
Properties Limited [1975] 2 NZLR 62 (CA), and 
Resources Limited v. Clark (1987) Unreported, 
Registry, 84/88. 
126 Petroleum Act 1937, s. 12. 
127 Idem. 
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v. Takaro 
Spectrum 
Wellington 
Given the fact that immediately upon announcing the grant to 
himself, the Crown was extending an invitation to the joint 
venture partners in Tariki, Ahuroa, and Waihapa in the 
Ngaere licence, 128 it must be deduced that in exercising his 
discretion, the terms and conditions of the grant as 
prescribed by the Minister must have encompassed a condition 
to the effect that even although the Minister IDJ..g_ licensee 
was authorised to mine, the requirement that the Minister 
actually undertake a work programme must have been waived. 
It is difficult to see how the Minister exercised his 
discretion for the purpose of granting a mining licence to 
authorise himself to mine for petroleum. It seems that 
there was no intention whatsoever to undertake the operation 
at all. It would be interesting to view the Minister's 
application for the licence and see to what extent the 
. f h . . f t ' ' f t' 12 9 requirements or t e provision o cer ain in orma ion 
have been satisfied. The plaintiffs in the case also assert 
that the Minister's main objective in exercising his 
discretion was to obtain for the government a large lump sum 
payment, and that such an objective is not contemplated by 
the Act. It must be conceded that such an outcome must be 
within the ambit of the Act, as there is a power for the 
Minister to sell licences, and it would not be unusual for 
128 See n. [ t t t 5 M J press s a emen ay. 
129 The Petroleum Regulations SR 1978/225, Reg. 7. 
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the licences to be extremely valuable, especially if the 
licence area contains a discovery. 
Even if these arguments could not prevail, there is a 
conspicuous absence of specific indicia in that particular 
part of the Petroleum Act pointing to the purposes for which 
a discretion may be exercised, and thus reliance must be 
placed on the long title. It is arguable whether or not the 
act of granting himself a licence for immediate resale comes 
within the ambit of "encouraging mining for petroleum". If 
the short term consequence of the decision was to place a 
licence in the hands of the joint venturers in the adjacent 
fields (thereby encouraging mining in the Ngaere field), 
then the process of making himself an intermediate licensee 
is otiose. In fact, in the long run, if potential miners 
are given to believe that mining licences could possibly be 
subject to a sale and purchase regime as opposed to a 
licensing (albeit with wide discretions) regime, then those 
potential miners might in fact be discouraged: at least the 
licensing regime is subject to judicial review. 130 
B. Relevant and Irrelevant Considerations 
130 See Webster v. Auckland Harbour Board [1983] NZLR 
646. 
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The classic case relating to judicial review of 
discretionary powers is Associated Provincial Houses v. 
d b t . 131 h . . We nes ury Corpora ion, w erein Lord Green MR enunciated 
the duties of a decision maker entrusted with a statutory 
discretion, amongst which was the duty to take into account 
all considerations which the statute expressly or implicitly 
makes relevant. The distinction between this duty and that 
of exercising a discretion for improper purposes is that in 
the latter case the power might be exercised for a purpose 
inconsistent with the purposes of the enabling statute, and 
yet all the considerations might have been relevant to the 
exercise of that power, so that even although the relevant 
considerations were accounted for, the intended result was 
not within the scope of the Act. In the former case, the 
correct purpose for which the power is given may have been 
intended in the use of that power, but the incorrect 
considerations or criteria might have been the basis for 
that exercise. The relevant considerations can be divided 
into mandatory considerations (those expressed in the 
statute), and permissible considerations (those matters 
which the decision maker may take into consideration without 
the decision being struck down upon the basis that 
irrelevant considerations were accounted for) . 132 There is 
13 l [ 19 4 8 ] 1 KB 2 2 3 . 
132 CREEDNZ v. Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172, and 
Ashby v. Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222. 
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a further aspect to these principles and that is having 
discerned the relevant criteria, and disregarded the 
irrelevant considerations, the decision maker must give not 
give undue weight to any one of the relevant criteria. The 
converse is where the Minister must not take into 
consideration criteria which is not relevant to the exercise 
of the discretion. 
As far as the case study goes, the Petroleum Act 1937 offers 
little in terms of overt considerations to be accounted for. 
The requirement that the Minister's discretion be consistent 
with the purpose of the Act aside, it has been stated that 
the Act places only three main limitations upon the 
Minister's discretion: "the term of a licence, the prior 
claim of the holder of a prospecting licence to a mining 
licence and the right of a holder of a prospecting licence 
to prohibit the grant of a mining licence to another 
person 11 • 133 There is little encouragement in the Ministry 
of Energy Act 1977, either, as that enactment provides for 
criteria which the Ministry (as opposed to the Minister) of 
'd 134 Energy must cons1 er. Given these factors, it would be 
most difficult for the plaintiffs to succeed on the ground 
of failure to have regard to relevant considerations. As 
133 Seen. 5 at p. 21. 
134 Ibid, pp. 22, 23. 
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far as the contention that the Minister had regard to 
irrelevant considerations, this question will turn on the 
evidence presented. If the evidence did show that the 
Minister was actually exercising the discretion on the basis 
of some extraneous consideration (like that of making the 
greatest advantage of the opportunity to use the licensing 
regime as a means of raising revenue) then there would be no 
question of mistaken consideration. 
All in all, given the lack of express criteria, the 
remaining argument for the plaintiffs would be that, on 
construction of the statute as a whole, the exercise of 
discretion was such that it defeated the spirit of the Act 
conferring that discretion. 135 The long title of the 
Petroleum Act 1937 includes as a part of the stated purpose 
of the Act, provision for the regulation of mining for 
petroleum. The Act then stipulates a prohibition upon 
prospecting and mining without a licence, and then provides 
for an elaborate licensing system. It goes without saying 
that had the legislature contemplated the regulation of 
mining in the manner of the Crown issuing licences to itself 
for sale to interested parties, then (a) the licensing 
regime would not be so elaborately expressed, and (b) the 
provisions in the Act allowing the method adopted in the 
13 5 d . t . d h . 1 E ucat1on Secre ary v. Tames1 e Boroug Counc1 
[1977) AC 1014. 
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instance would have had more features included relating to 
the regulation of the activities. On balance, without 
reliance upon any special facts, this argument presents the 
Crown with great difficulty. 
c. Breach of Legitimate Expectation 
This ground of judicial review, as a subset of the 
principles espoused under the subject of natural justice, is 
one of the most recently developed. Although not entirely 
static as to its dimensions, to date it em.braces either 
t t . f f . h . 136 t . expec a ion o a air earing, or expec ation of a 
favourable state of affairs when a licence or other benefit 
. b . ht 137 is eing soug . It is clear that the exercise of a 
discretion can affect an individual where that individual 
might only have an interest, liberty, or expectation -
something less than a legal right. The applicant for a 
licence is usually allowed a fair hearing to enable the 
applicant to negate any allegation raised. The scope of 
application also extends to revocation, suspension, and 
non-renewal of licences granted. 138 Although the number of 
times licensing situations arisen whereby any hearing of any 
136 Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority (1980] 1 
WLR 582. 
137 Schmidt v. Home Secretary (1969] 2 Ch 149. 
138 Mcinnes v. Onslow-Fane (1978] 1 WLR 1520. 
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nature has not occurred are numerous, it has been submitted 
that this alone does not deprive administrative procedure of 
the application of natural justice nor judicial review. 139 
The only limitation would be "administrative exigencies'' and 
any contrary indications implicit in the scheme of the 
legislation. 
The most recent refinement of the relevant law in new 
Zealand was by the Court of Appeal in Fowler & Roderigue 
140 Limited v. Attorney-General where Somers J stated that 
the exercise of of power (to limit the number of licences) 
does not necessarily entail the calling for submissions in 
every case, that the giving of a person the opportunity to 
be heard is dependent upon the circumstances. One 
circumstance in which the decision maker must have regard to 
the interest of persons affected prior to exercising a 
discretion is where: 
" ... the exercise of the power is likely to affect the 
interests of an individual in a way that is 
significantly different from the way in which it is 
139 HWR Wade, Administrative Law (5 ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1984), at p. 497. 
140 [1987] 2 NZLR 56, applied in Gallagher v. 
Attorney-General (Unreported) Wellington Registry, CP 
402/88. 
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likely to affect the interests of the public 
11 II 141 genera y ... 
The rule was further stated to include the proposition that: 
"Where a person having no legal right to the renewal of 
the licence or permit has a reasonable and legitimate 
expectation of renewal the Court will normally 
intervene to protect that expectation by judicial 
. ,,142 review. 
The consequence of these rules is that decisions falling 
within the above category are subject to consultation, that 
the outcome of that consultative process is not necessarily 
fulfilment of that expectation, nor provision for a formal 
hearing with the attendant judicial consideration of 
submissions. A recent decision revealed a further aspect of 
the rule, an aspect akin to that of estoppel. 143 The 
essence of this concept is that statements of intent, 
assurances, or promises made by the decision maker prior to 
making the decision to the effect that the decision would be 
made in accordance with certain criteria would be sufficient 
141 Ibid, at 74. 
142 Idem. 
143 Bradley v. Attorney-General 7 NZAR 193. 
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to raise a legitimate expectation within the mind of the 
person affected that the criteria would be followed. 144 
On the facts of the case study, the plaintiffs have relied 
on the fact that the joint venture had already carried out 
significant prospecting and mining in adjacent areas, and 
the discovery at Waihapa indicated that the field might 
extend beyond the area comprised in the Waihapa licence 
area. A crucial assertion on the part of the plaintiffs is 
that Ministry officials gave the joint venturers the 
impression that if appraisal work indicated the 
accumulations did extend beyond the licence area, then there 
would be no obstacle to extending the licence area 
accordingly. 
It is clear the plaintiffs would be affected by the decision 
in a manner which was significantly different from that of 
the public in general. The activity is highly specialised, 
and the plaintiffs are entrepreneurs dedicated to this type 
of undertaking: no ordinary member of the public would be 
able to partake in the same manner. Discussions with 
officials indicated a decision would be made in a certain 
way. The actual decision did not involve any consultation. 
The fact that the Minister's interest is being offered for 
144 See also, R. v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Ex Parte Kahn [1985) 1 All ER 40. 
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sale back to the joint venturers seems to support the 
implication that the Minister, as decision maker, did not 
have regard to the person affected by the decision. In 
terms of the two "limbs" of legitimate expectation, the 
facts seem to point towards them both being breached. The 
expectation raised by the Ministry's assurances, and the 
lack of consultation appear to be fatal to the defendant. 
The only possible argument in defence would be that the 
decision involved a high degree of policy and therefore the 
rules of natural justice need not be complied with. On the 
facts, this would be difficult to sustain. The situation is 
well outside the range of "national security" cases. 
Exactly what is the policy and objective arising from 
issuing a licence then selling the interest in that licence 
to the persons who had applied for a similar licence anyway 
is not easy to discover. It does not appear to be an 
"urgent" situation, thus ruling out the "administrative 
exigencies" exception. It is doubtful that any exclusions 
can be relied upon. 
D. Unfairness or unreasonableness 
A parallel duty to that of avoiding "unreasonableness" in 
the sense of a general category of abuse of discretionary 
power was enunciated by Lord Greene MR in Wednesbury 
(supra), that duty being restraint from doing" ... something 
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so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it 
lay within the powers of the authority. 11145 The classic 
example given is that of dismissing a red haired teacher on 
the grounds of hair colour. The extent of this principle 
was explored in Council for Civil Service Unions v. Minister 
, · 1 . 146 h . . . for Civi Service were Lord Diplock opined that this 
ground for judicial review (renamed "irrationality")would 
apply to 
11 
••• a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance 
of logic· or moral standards that no sensible person who 
had applied his mind to the question to be decided 
could have arrived at. 11147 
It could be that this statement might be stating the 
principle in too harsh terms, that very few plaintiffs would 
succeed if this was the definitive test. Be that as it may, 
the principle has been applied in cases where the exercise 
of a discretion was for financial motives. An example of 
this was where an elaborate licensing systems established to 
issue licences in respect of public houses destroyed during 
war time was run in such a way that a condition of obtaining 
145 seen. 131 at p. 229. 
146 (1985] AC 374. 
147 Ibid, at 951. 
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a licence was to purchase sufficient outstanding licences to 
cover the estimated sales of the licenced premises with the 
result that there was relief from payment of compensation 
otherwise payable to the outstanding licensees. 148 
Irrespective of the stringency of the test prescribed in 
Council for Civil Service Unions case (supra), there is 
reasonable support for the application of this test in New 
Zealand149 notwithstanding the tide of decisions attempting 
to widen the availability of judicial review on the ground 
f · . 1 . t 15 O t . th t o 1rrat1ona 1 y. Accep 1ng e s ronger test, success 
by the plaintiffs on the grounds of the breach of confidence 
would suffice to come within the bounds of "outrageous 
defiance of moral standards". There could be no lesser 
moral standard than that imposed by equity. On the facts, 
it would seem that the "financial motive'' is also relevant. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
A. Resource Management Law Reform 
148 R. v. Birmingham Licensing Planning Committee ex 
parte Kennedy (1972] 2 QB 140. 
149 Seen. 130 at p. 145. 
150 R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Preston 
(1985] AC 835 and Wheeler v. Leicester City Council (1985] 
AC 1054. 
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"The Government is committed to the reform of our 
resource management laws. By the end of 1989 we aim to 
have in place a clear and effective legislative basis 
for the future management of New Zealand's natural 
resources. 11151 
The scope of the reform described above covers a review of 
legislation in the areas of town and country planning, water 
and soil use, minerals, as well as environmental enhancement 
and protection procedures. 
One of the problems confronting this area of law has been 
it's fragmented format: in some cases, legislation may 
present conflicts to resource use by, for example, appearing 
to overlap in certain circumstances. The process of the 
reform then, involves looking at the values that are placed 
on resources, ascertaining and giving recognition to Maori 
cultural and spiritual values (including the application of 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi), examining the 
ownership of the rights to resources, and assessing the 
extent of the ideal amount of public participation in 
d . . k. 152 ec1s1on ma 1ng. The desired outcome of the process is 
therefore to enable the distribution of rights in a just 
151 Speech Rt Hon G Palmer, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister for the Environment, Greymouth, 4 May 1988. 
152 Idem. 
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manner (including consideration of existing holders' rights, 
the crown's obligations, and the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi), to ensure that resources provide the greatest 
benefit to society and to that end are transferable to where 
they are most valued, provide a fair and consistent dispute 
resolution process, and an environmental management system 
which will enable respect for ecosystems as well as 
t ' ' f f t t' 
153 
sus a1n1ng resources or u ure genera ions. 
In terms of the issues raised in this paper, there is no 
doubt as to the importance of petroleum in. any modern 
society. To this end, it is probably quite right that the 
Crown retain full ownership of this resource. As far as the 
distribution of this resource in a "just manner" is 
concerned, then clearly, the present distribution and 
allocation framework requires some change. In respect of 
the Crown being the final distributor of rights and access 
to the resource, there appears to be sufficient bases for 
potential conflict. As licensor, the discretions available 
to it are narrow insofar as they are subject to judicial 
review, notwithstanding the lack of explicit criteria laid 
down in the legislation as to how the resource should be 
allocated. This matter alone should be sufficient for 
concern. By participating as a developer of the resource, 
153 Speech by Rt Hon G Palmer, Minister for the 
Environment, Wellington, 23 May 1988. 
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the distribution in a "just manner" becomes even more 
difficult. The rights to resources of existing (and 
potential) holders are in conflict with the obligations of 
the Crown from the outset. The Crown is in an enormously 
advantaged position in relation to resolution of disputes. 
B. Ministry of Energy Policy 
The espoused policy of the Ministry of Energy is that market 
forces alone will not necessarily produce efficient supply 
of energy, nor ensure adequate consideration to long term 
needs, nor wise management of energy resources. 154 
Ironically, the Ministry is "committed to the promotion of 
competitive and open market as the primary means of enabling 
• I 1 f d • • t b h • 155 society s goa s or energy an mining o e ac ieved". 
The Resource Management and Mining Group aim to promote, 
develop and maintain an environment for the effective 
contribution of development and mining to the benefit of New 
Zealand, and see their function as that of the Crown's 
representative in ownership of "most" of New Zealand's 
energy and minerals and thus, their role is to allocate 
property rights to mineral and energy resources. The 
consequence to this is that there is an aim of obtaining for 
154 Mi'ni'stry f E C t R t 1987 o nergy orpora e epor . 
155 Idem. 
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the Crown a return for the use of the energy and minerals 
owned by the Crown "in the best interests of New Zealand". 
With respect, it must be quite clear that as long as the 
Crown is able to participate in petroleum development, the 
dual nature of its role does not facilitate the objectives 
stated. The temptation for the Ministry to take advantage 
of situations arising to obtain the highest return for the 
Crown will impede the confidence of those willing to partake 
in this high risk industry. This can only be detrimental in 
the long run. Like so many state industries "rationalised" 
by the Crown in the coporatisation process, it is submitted 
that the Crown clearly delineate between its regulatory 
function and its operating function, and opt only for the 
former. 
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